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Although economic growth is inherently linked with the structure and nature of SMEs (e.g. their 
number, industry concentration, size, degree of outsourcing, etc), as this has been shown in the 
existing literature, OIs
1, more generally, are the context in which SMEs operate and hence OIs 
ought to be more closely examined in order to further understand the complex process of economic 
growth and the particular impact of SMEs on the latter. In this paper, a detailed comparison of the 
growth of manufacturing sectors in the USA and Japan is used as an indirect way to demonstrate 
the following proposition. Although SMEs have played a positive role in the postwar economic 
Japanese miracle, they are not a sufficient force for a sustainable economic growth, as the recent 
protracted recession in Japan shows. It is only when technological innovations and in particular 
OIs take place in the economy that this type of growth is possible, as this is also demonstrated in 




The importance of SMEs in contributing to economic growth has been emphasized in many papers 
and books (e.g.  Acs et al, 1998). Sanidas (2002b) has provided some evidence on the links 
between SMEs, organizational innovations (OIs)
2, and economic growth across OECD countries 
with particular reference to Japan and the USA.  In this paper, a close comparison between the 
manufacturing sectors in these two countries reveals that there is evidence that the recent 
American economic survival and the recent Japanese protracted economic downturn can be related 
to the existence of OIs, and that the relative importance of SMEs in the two countries is only a 
contingent factor necessary but not sufficient for economic growth.  
 
OIs are the context in which SMEs operate and hence OIs ought to be more closely examined in 
order to further understand the complex process of economic growth and the particular impact of 
SMEs on the latter. In this paper, a detailed comparison of the growth of manufacturing sectors in 
the USA and Japan is used as an indirect way to demonstrate the following proposition. Although 
SMEs have played a positive role in the postwar economic Japanese miracle, they are not a 
sufficient force for a sustainable economic growth, as the recent protracted recession in Japan 
shows. It is only when technological innovations and in particular OIs take place in the economy 
that this type of growth is possible, as this is also demonstrated in the recent American prolonged 
economic growth.  
 
                                            
1 Examples of OIs are: production and distribution forms such as the factory system or the integration of 
mass production and distribution; the management structure of the firm such as the M-form; the production 
process from the organization point of view, such as the just-in-time (JIT) process;  the organization of the 
shop floor, for example according to scientific management; clusters of SMEs, etc. See beloow and 
references for further details.  
2 For a good summary of OIs historically see Sanidas, 2002a.  
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Another way of e xpressing the above proposition is to make the following remark. The same 
SMEs, which played a positive role in generating a fast industrial growth in Japan during the 
1970s and 1980s, have not been able to sustain a similar growth during the prolonged recession of 
the 1990s and probably the 2000s. A brief analysis of the number of SMEs and their corresponding 
employment shows that only a very slight increase in the size of firms is taking place in the 1990s 
in Japan, despite a substantial drop in the total number of SMEs and corresponding employment 
due to the negative effects of recession (see Table 1). Similarly for the USA, but in the opposite 
direction, the same SMEs, which played their role in generating a rather poor industrial growth in 
this country during the 1970s and 1980s, have been able to induce a much faster growth during the 
1990s and probably the 2000s. Consequently, the explanation in these two opposite phenomena for 
the two countries can only be explained by referring to other factors such as the OIs. Effectively, 
Sanidas, 2001 provides extensive evidence that the imitation of the just-in-time cum quality 
control (JIT/QC) holistic system (an OI) by an increasing number of American manufacturing 
firms and sectors in the last 15 years or so has significantly contributed to the revival of the 
American economy during this period. 
 
Table 1  Japan: recent developments in establishments, employment and size 
 
 
   Total manufacturing     Automobiles sector     TVs and radios sector 
YearEst/ts  Empl/nt  Size  Est/ts  Empl/nt  Size  Est/ts  Empl/nt  Size 
1990 436 11173 25.6 11184 789  70.5       
1991 430.4 11351 26.4 11201 829  74      
1992 415.1 11157 26.9 10997 812  73.8       
1993 413.7 10885 26.3 11098 800  72.1       
1994 382.8 10416 27.2 10467 788  75.3 8887  434 48.8
1995 387.7 10190 26.3 10648 767  72 8628  427 49.5
1996 369.6 9990 27 10126 769  75.9 7944  408 51.4
1997 358.3 9835 27.4 9963 769  77.2 7885  406 51.5
 
Sources and notes: UNIDOb, 1996 and 2000. ‘Est/ts’ stands for number of establishments; ‘Empl/nt’ stands 
for number of employees’; ‘size’ is the number of employees per establishment. For the sector of ‘TVs and 
radios’ it is not possible to have consistent data for the whole period in the Table. 
 
In order to properly evaluate the importance of OIs and SMEs, the comparison between American 
and Japanese manufacturing sectors will take place in sections 1 and 2 for various periods between 
1960 and 1998 and for the variables of real output and TFP.  In section 3 the recent protracted 
Japanese economic downturn is analyzed in the light of OIs and other relevant issues. In section 4 
OIs are compared with technical innovations (TIs) in the two countries. In section 5, two leading 
sectors in Japan and the USA, namely semiconductors and personal computers bring more 
evidence to the propositions of this paper. 
  
Before starting the sectoral analysis it is necessary to briefly provide some definitions for OIs and 
TIs. The definition of technology provided by an international institution, the United Nations 
Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), in 1983 is revealing: 
“…Technology may be embodied in the form of capital goods, such as machinery, equipment and 
physical structures; or it may be disembodied in such forms as industrial property rights, 
unpatented know-how, management and organization (my emphasis), and design and operating 
instructions for production systems…” (UNCTC, 1985,  p. 119)
3. 
 
A key feature in this study is to separate embodied from disembodied in the definition of 
technology. Hence, OIs make part of disembodied technology (according to the above definition of 
the UNCTC). The term technical innovations (TIs)
4 is coined to refer to embodied technology.  
 
                                            
3 Also quoted in Dicken, 1998, p. 248. 
4 Good examples of TIs are the innovations of semiconductors, use of aluminum in many products etc.  
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Five sections constitute this paper. The first section presents a detailed sectoral comparison between 
the USA and Japan in terms of real output. The sectoral comparison in terms of TFP and real output 
from 1960 to 1985 is undertaken in the second section. The period 1987 to 1997 is examined in the 
third section, in which some explanations of the recent Japanese economic downfall are provided. In 
order to separate more effectively the role of OIs and TIs in the process of sectoral growth, section 
four examines the performance of three key sectors. Finally, section five examines two other key 
sectors in terms of OIs. The role of SMEs in all this sectoral comparison will be indicated whenever 
necessary.    
 
 
1  Analysis of the American and Japanese Series of Manufacturing Sectoral Real 
Output  
 
1.1  Analysis from 1963 to 1998 
 
The following Figures 1 and 2 show the growth patterns of real output for the USA and Japan from 
1963 to 1998, for two manufacturing sectors (another sector is shown further below and the 
remaining sectors are shown in Appendix A1). Also on the same graphs, two more variables are 
shown, namely the first difference of the two indexes of industrial production (called ‘jadus’), and 
the second difference of the two indexes (called ‘djadus’). These last two series offer a way of 
detecting stationarity and cointegration, which in turn can be used to conclude whether a given 
sector followed the same pattern of growth or not through time in the two countries. A formal test 
of cointegration was also carried out for each pair of sectoral series to confirm these conclusions 
(some of these tests for the ‘non-ferrous metals’ sector are shown in Appendix A2).    
 
From these Figures we can draw some interesting conclusions. First, for almost every sector, the 
Japanese growth was very strong up to the mid 1970s (the catching-up stage with the USA), and 
then it slowed down, and finally decreased in the 1990s. However, over the whole period, the 
Japanese growth rates have been higher than the American ones in most sectors as Figure 4 shows. 
Table 2 summarizes the relative strength of each sector’s growth between the two countries. 
 
















































































































Source: Based on UNIDO, 1999. 
 
Table 2   Growth Rates in Real Output from 1964 to 1998, Industry differences 
Category (1) 
American growth was 
higher than that of 
Japan 
Category (2) 
American growth was close 
to that of Japan 
Category (3) 
American growth was lower 
than that of Japan 
1.  Beverages  1.  Food  1. Other Chemicals  
2.  Textiles  2.  Industrial   Chemicals   2. Petroleum Refineries 
3.  Wood  3.  Rubber  3. Miscellaneous Petroleum     and 
Coal 
4.  Furniture  4.  Pottery and China  4. Iron and Steel 
5.  Printing  5.  Glass  5. Non-Ferrous Metals  
6.  Plastic  6.  Other Non-Metal Minerals   6. Fabricated Metals  
7.  Non-Electrical 
Machinery 
  7. Electrical Machinery 
8.  Others    8. Transport Equipment 
    9. Professional and Scientific 
Equipment 
    10. Apparel 
    11. Leather 
    12. Footwear 
    13. Tobacco 
    14. Paper 
Source: Based on UNIDO, 1999. 
 
For the first category, out of the 8 sectors, it is worth noting the substantial gradual decline of the 
main leading sector of the Japanese economy up to the 1930s (Minami, 1986), namely the 
Textiles. Also, it is worth noting the Non-Electrical Machinery (it includes computers) for which 
the Americans have always been the leaders (however, note that the higher American growth in 
this sector is not substantial). In the second category, it is worth mentioning the equal strength of 
the Industrial Chemicals and Rubber. In category (3) out of the 14 sectors almost all the heavy 
manufacturing industries have been more dynamic in Japan than in the USA during the whole 
period 1964 to 1998. It will be indicated in this study that it is precisely in these ‘heavy’ sectors 
that the Japanese firms, entrepreneurs and managers have been mostly innovative in terms of OIs. 
Overall, the Japanese growth rates have been higher or almost as high in 20 out of the 28 sectors 
considered. 
 
Furthermore, and as the Figures (see this text and Appendix A1) for each sector show, the two 
national real output series for every industry need in most cases to be twice differenced in order to 
be cointegrated. This means that the two national economies have been following their own 
independent paths of growth. These paths have been much more dependent on their underlying 
historical background and their own OIs than their own TIs since Japan has always been in most  
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cases an imitator of foreign and especially American technology (see section 4 below). An 
example will demonstrate the evidence given by formal cointegration methodology.  This example 
is based on the Non-Ferrous Metals industry, which shows a steadily faster growth of the Japanese 
sector than the American one during the period 1963 to 1998 as the Figures 3a and 3b exhibit. 
 






























Source: Based on UNIDO, 1999. 
 
From Figure 3a we would expect no cointegration as the two national series grow in different 
speeds. Effectively, as the full printout shown in Appendix A2 indicates, all the appropriate tests 
such as the one based on maximum eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix confirm the non-
cointegration of the two indexes of real output for non-ferrous metals. From Figure 3b we can 
conclude that the first difference between the Japanese and the American series of output (“jadus”) 
is not enough to produce a stationary series; however, when “jadus” is differenced once more 
(“djadus”), then we have a stationary series; the unit root tests conducted for the four time series 
(the two original ones plus jadus plus djadus) confirm these conclusions. 
 


















































Source: Based on UNIDO, 1999.  
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Source: UNIDO, 1999. Note: the code numbers of each sector are indicated on the x-axis. See Appendix A3 
for the corresponding names. 
 
1.2  Analysis of three sub-periods 
 
The period 1964 to 1998 will now be split into 3 sub-periods so that more appropriate conclusions 
can be drawn upon. These sub-periods are between 10 and 13 years long and each one of them 
includes a major depression (the two oil shocks plus the beginning of the 1990s). The Figures 5 
and 6 show the changes in growth between the 3 sub-periods considered. 
 

























































































Source: Based on UNIDO, 1999. 
 
From these Figures (5 and 6) it is worth making the following comments. For the USA, the period 
1964 to 1976 saw the highest growth rates almost in all sectors, followed by the period 1977 to 
1986, with the lowest growth rates occurring in the third period 1987 to 1998. However, there are 
some outstanding exceptions to these patterns. For the latter period, two industries are now leading 
the American economy, namely the Non-Electrical Machinery (mainly the computers component) 
and the Electrical Machinery (mainly the semiconductors component). These two sectors have 
been experiencing the highest growth rates (at least double the others) amongst all 28 industries 
during 1987-98 and higher growth rates than in the other two sub-periods. Also, during 1987-98 
Iron and Steel has been strongly reviving, and Rubber continued its steadily high growth. It will be 
further emphasized in this paper that these currently leading sectors of the American economy 
have been more than any other sector following and imitating the Japanese OIs.  
 
For Japan, it is remarkable how the two oil price shocks have slowed down almost all sectors 
considerably during the second period 1977 to 1986. The three exceptions to this pattern were the 
two Machinery sectors, especially the Electrical Machinery (in which the Japanese semiconductor 
sub-sector was booming during that period), and the Professional and Precision Instruments sector 
(in which the photographic equipment and the watches sub-sectors established themselves in the 
world). During the third sub-period 1987 to 1998, all sectors experienced a deep plunge, with the 
least affected sectors being the Electrical Machinery, the Chemicals, the Non-Ferrous Metals, the 
Petroleum, the Paper, and the Transport ones. Some explanations will be provided in section 3 
regarding the Japanese manufacturing industries’ protracted recession during the 1990s.  
 
In addition, for each sub-period the growth rates are compared for each sector between the two 
countries (see Figures 7a, 7b, and 7c). Some remarks are necessary. First, during the period 1964 
to 1976, only a limited number of industries showed a higher growth rate in the USA than in Japan 
(Beverages, Wood, Furniture, Printing, Plastic, and Others). Second, during both periods 1977 to 
1986, and 1987 to 1998 the Americans did perform better than the Japanese in most industries. 
However, an interesting reversal took place between these two periods. Whereas, during 1977 to 
1986 the Japanese grew faster in the three leading sectors of Non-Electrical Machinery, Electrical 
Machinery, and Professional and Precision Instruments, the situation was reversed during the 
period 1987 to 1998. This is an important finding and is further explored in Sanidas, 2001 where it 
was shown that when the Americans imitated the Japanese in terms of OIs they started performing 

















































Source: Based on UNIDO, 1999. 
 
 







































Source: Based on UNIDO, 1999. 
 












































Source: Based on UNIDO, 1999.  
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Second, there are some sectors (chemicals, petrol, non-ferrous metals, and paper) for which the 
Japanese growth was still positive in the 1990s. I t is especially remarkable for the chemical 
industries to have been growing strongly and continually during the whole period of 1963 to 1998, 
despite some criticisms. For example, Arora et al (1999) observed “…The availability of imported 
technology and the general backward state of the chemical industry itself enabled users – firms in 
downstream sectors - to play a more prominent role in the chemical industry…The keiretsu 
structure therefore exacerbated the tendency, caused by import protection, toward production at 
scales that were too small to be economic…” (p. 245). However, it was precisely the Japanese 
characteristics of the chemical industry organization –keiretsu structure, many producers, and high 
degree of product customization etc- that was the reason of the strong continuous growth of that 
industry. Furthermore, as it can be seen in Figure 1, that both the American and Japanese chemical 
sectors grew in the same or parallel way after the mid 1970s, despite substantial differences in OIs 
traits between the two countries.  
 
 
2  TFP and Real Output in the USA and Japan from 1960 to 1985  
 
Figure 8 shows the average annual rate of change in TFP for Japan and the USA, for 28 2-digit 
sectors, from 1960 to 1980, as they have been calculated by two expert panels, namely, first by 
Jorgenson et al (1995), and second by Kuroda et al (1996). The methodology both panels used was 
quite similar and based on Jorgenson’s work (e.g. 1990). The Figure shows, that there are some 
differences but not significant. Other similar work (for example, Denny et al, 1992) confirms these 
results. The main conclusion out of this comparison is the higher TFP in Japan than in the USA in 
almost all industries, the clear exceptions being the sectors of agriculture, construction, printing, 
petroleum, rubber, and services. Hence, the overwhelming majority of the manufacturing 2-digit 
sectors exhibited higher TFP growth rates for Japan than for the USA during that period. 
 
Another conclusion out of this Figure is that both countries have been experiencing higher growth 
rates in TFP almost in the same sectors, namely the electrical machinery, precision instruments, 
non-electrical machinery, transport and communication, and fabricated metals. Japan’s growth has 
been more pronounced in the chemicals, fabricated metals, lumber, leather, transport equipment, 
miscellaneous manufacturing, and finance.  
 
Figure 9 concentrates on the TFP growth rates from 1960 to 1970 and from 1960 to 1985, as 
calculated by Kuroda et al (1996). As expected, TFP was much higher in general for the former 
period in Japan because the 1960-1985 period included two major depressions due to the oil price 
shocks. On the contrary, these depressions did not affect the USA to the same extent (which is not 
a surprising result for t his country on account of its large natural resources). Furthermore, the 





































































Source: Jorgenson et al (1995), and Kuroda et al (1996); Japan (J) refers to Jorgenson et al (1995).  
 
 













































Source: Kuroda et al (1996). 
 
Figure 10 shows the rates of growth of real output for Japan and the USA, for 1960-1985. These 
rates are consistent with the rates of TFP. It is striking how much higher are the Japanese growth 
rates both for real output and TFP. 
 
Why did the Japanese economy achieve such a high and sustained economic growth during 1960 
to 1985, which was much higher than what the USA experienced during the same period? What 
role did the OIs play in this development?  
 
The leading manufacturing sectors have been mainly the electrical machinery, motor  vehicles, 
precision equipment, miscellaneous manufacturing, and to a lesser extent fabricated metals, 
chemicals and fabricated textiles. In all these principal industries (and others in general), the 
quality  of the product has been the principal force through which the Japanese firms quickly 
penetrated foreign markets such as the American ones
5.  However, this statement about quality 
                                            
5 This openness started after WWII, contrary to Japan which kept being more protective of its 
infant industries until quite recently.  
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begs the question of why the Japanese firms achieved such reputation about quality in their 
products after WWII. The answer to this question lies in the OI of the JIT/QC system as many 
scholars have testified (e. g. Porter and Takeuchi, 1999; Womack et al, 1990; Abegglen and Stalk, 
1985, and others). Here, it is worth reminding the reader that Japanese products were not always 
renown for their quality. On the contrary before WWII quality was rather absent in these products 
(for confirmation of this historical fact see Best, 1990; Odagiri and Goto, 1996; and Juran, 1995). 
 












































Source: Kuroda et al (1996). 
 
In addition, Japanese firms had a good background of pre-conditions in order to produce several 
products of a very high quality.  These pre-conditions were the existence of a cooperative focal 
firm specializing in its core competences, with a strong emphasis on human development, strong 
networks, and cooperation with a patriotic government. The new structure was the establishment 
of a practical spirit for quality products through the implementation of philosophies such as the 
TQC, the JIT and low inventories, the market penetration criterion in business, a new production 
process involving all these elements together, a large number of SMEs, and a strong domestic 
competition for many manufacturing sub-sectors under new more democratic institutions (for more 
details see Sanidasa, 2002, and Sanidasb, 2002).  
 
 
3  TFP and real output in the USA and Japan from 1986 to 1997: Explanations 
of the recent Japanese Economic Downfall  
 
The following Figures (11 and 12) summarize the comparative data for TFP and real output  
between the two countries during the period 1987 to 1998. Clearly, these Figures show that Japan 
has been going through a deep recession during the last 10 years or so, especially in comparison to 
the USA. The manufacturing sectors that exhibited the least downfall are Non-Ferrous Metals, 
Transport, Electrical machinery, Chemicals, Iron and Steel, and Paper Products. A full 
examination and explanation of this recent Japanese economic diving cannot be undertaken here. 
However, in relation to this study some partial relevant views will now be offered.  
 
If we have a look again at the graphs of sectoral manufacturing real output for Japan and the USA 
since 1963 (see Appendix A1), it is easily noticeable that many sectors in Japan stopped growing 
since a certain date prior to the recent recession. So, though for both these countries, Leather, 
Footwear, Apparel, and Tobacco have been declining or remained stagnant since the 1970s, many 
other sectors declined or remained stagnant only for Japan and not for the USA. These were 
Furniture, Wood Products, Textiles, and Beverages. In total, eight sectors out of the 28 3-digit 
manufacturing sectors have been performing poorly or even negatively. If on top of these  
  12
industries we add several service sectors notorious for their inefficiency in Japan (such as public 
services, and banks) then it becomes evident that Japan is still a dual economy. Thus, we have the 
leading sectors –transport, machinery- and their satellites –iron and steel, other metals etc- which 
have been the pioneering moving forces of the Japanese economic miracle, and on the other side 
we have all the remaining sectors in manufacturing and services which lag behind in performance 
and effectiveness. 
 

















































Source: Based on UNIDO, 1999 for both countries; the capital stock data were obtained from NBER, 2000 
for the USA, and from EPA, 2000,  for Japan.    
 
 

















































Source: Based on UNIDO, 1999 for both countries. 
 
Many scholars have made similar comments. Porter and Takeuchi (1999) have emphasized the 
micro-economic nature of recent Japanese failures. First, they stress “…the consensus over Japan’s 
past success has come overwhelmingly from the robust growth of a relatively small number of 
industries…” (p. 67) such as semi-conductors, machine tools, steel and vehicles. In addition 
Japan’s exports are dominated by a relatively small number of industries in “…automotives, 
consumer electronics, office machines, and production machinery. In huge areas of the economy 
there are few if any successful exporters, including chemicals, packaged goods, services, and 
health care…” (p. 72). Second, the same authors in their extensive study (1999, p. 78) remark:  
  13
 
“…Many of Japan’s failures can also be traced to fragmented, inefficient, and anachronistic 
domestic sectors such as retailing, wholesaling, logistics, financial services, health care, energy, 
trucking, telecommunications, housing, and agriculture. By design, government policies have 
created two Japans: one composed of highly productive export industries, the other containing 
domestic sectors…The inefficient Japan drives up business costs across the board, weakening the 
competitiveness of the export industries…” 
 
From the OIs point of view, the same writers Porter and Takeuchi (1999) recognize the importance 
of JIT/QM in Japan’s economic growth (p. 71):      
 
“…The model of Japanese corporate success centers on the notion that a company can achieve 
both high quality and low cost by employing- and continuously improving- fundamentally better 
managerial practices. The idea is that companies compete by relentlessly staying at the frontier of 
best practice. This model is not an abstract theory but stems from extraordinary advances made by 
Japanese companies after the introduction of now well-known managerial practices, such as total 
quality management (TQM), lean production, and close supplier relationships…” 
 
However, still from the OIs view, the same authors pinpoint some relative weaknesses in Japan’s 
organizational structures. These are various activities such as planning and control, finance, 
logistics, distribution, order processing, customer information, and after-sale service, information 
technology, the Internet, marketing, and office operations. Consequently, Porter and Tekeuchi 
(1999, p. 81) suggest that the “…companies must move from an exclusively egalitarian, seniority-
driven model to one where doing things differently is rewarded in compensation, advancement, 
and opportunities for entrepreneurship…” In the book version of the just cited article, Porter et al 
(2000, p. 189) recommended that Japan must move beyond competition just based on quality 
products to competing on strategy and innovation that result in ‘true profitability’.   
 
According to Mroczkowski and Hanaoka (1998), the following changes have already been taking 
place in Japan: 
1.  Performance-based evaluation and rewards: by 1995, 75% of Japanese companies 
administered pay by competency and merit (and hence not by seniority), whereas in 1987 
the relevant percentage was 54%, and in 1978 it was 42%. These figures are supported by 
other surveys as well. 
2.  Evidence of change in social values: Japanese employees’ attitudes are moving away from 
loyalty to the company and towards identification with their profession. 
3.  Manipulation of working time: overall hours worked (including overtime) are b eing 
reduced in larger companies. Also the use of flextime systems is increasing. However, 
both these elements are not true for SMEs. 
4.  Early retirement: this means a job transfer to a subsidiary or affiliated company under less 
attractive conditions. Again SMEs lag behind the larger firms in implementing this policy 
(in 1995, 17% as against 40% respectively). 
5.  Lifetime employment and transfers: the “koyochosei” (employment adjustment) is now 
replaced by the “shukko” system (either temporary or permanent transfer to other 
companies). 
6.  Employment of women and foreigners: between 1992 and 1995 the proportion of women 
in management positions has doubled, although still low by international standards. 
Though attitudes of employers change rapidly, 40% of Japanese companies employ 
foreigners whose status is still inferior to that of Japanese workers.  
 
The same authors (1998) predict that probably by 2010 the Japanese management system, at least 
in terms of human resources will be like the Western one. This prediction is based on surveys they 
conducted with Japanese company managers, academics, and management consultants. However,  
it seems too difficult to change a history of more than a 100 years within a frame of 10 to 20 years. 
I think Japan will emerge out of this new crisis (yet another one in the last two centuries) with a 
new organizational outlook, which will be a marriage between the old features and some new ones 
and hence it will not be just another Western country.  
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The analysis in this sub-section so far shows that Japan still has much to accomplish in order to be 
considered a fully developed country. We often forget that this country’s enormous progress since 
WWII does not necessarily mean that problems of under development do not exist any more. The 
Japanese dual economic nature will eventually disappear, but until then many changes in terms of 
OIs must take place. This is consistent with one point of this paper, namely that OIs which are 
good for one country’s economic growth are not necessarily good for another, and that OIs which 
are good in one historical stage of economic development are not necessarily good for another 
historical stage. This point is consistent with the contingency theory of management.  
 
Several other authors have taken the same stand vis-à-vis my last remark. It is worth noting that 
almost 20years ago, Abernathy  et al (1983), have expressed the same ideas and somehow 
predicted a Japanese downfall: 
 
“…The modern Japanese system of production is not some manufacturing Nirvana, free of all 
tensions and problems that beset such systems elsewhere. It is the result of a set of deliberate 
choices and trade-offs and is appropriate not to every economic context imaginable but, rather, to 
the specific context of postwar Japan. If that country’s social or political stability becomes 
problematical, if the work force ages too greatly, if expectations about living standards rise too 
quickly, if key industries cannot sustain their rate of growth, if- in short- changing conditions give 
the lie to the assumptions on which much of that production system rests, it will inevitably show the 
strain…” (p. 84) 
 
This extract hints on the contingency theory of management and the ‘changing conditions’ the 
authors just mentioned are actually taking place in the most recent decade in Japan. In brief, there 
are no leading or key sectors any more in that country (as my sectoral analysis has demonstrated 
above), the work force ‘ages too greatly’, the younger generation has higher expectations about 
living standards without the willingness to do the ‘dirty’ jobs any more, and the social and political 
stability is no longer so strong in Japan.  
 
The importance of leading sectors in the present economic situation in Japan has been apparently a 
key issue in economic circles of that country according to Ito (1996, p. 236): “…Unless there is 
some structural reform, new industries will not emerge and the slow growth will continue. The 
appropriate kind of reform and the new leading industries that might emerge are debated 
intensively in Japan…” This author then examined several sectors, which might benefit from 
structural reform in terms of promoting competition: airlines, telecommunications and 
broadcasting, financial services, distribution, and agriculture and land use. The same author, like 
many others, also analyzed the importance of the share and land prices bubble and its collapse in 
explaining the long recession in Japan. Finally, it is worth noting the role of the globalization 
tendencies present in many Japanese firms and its consequences in terms of growth in Japan and in 
terms of changes in OIs such as the sub-contracting process. Ito (1996, p. 220) quotes some figures 
of employment that are very revealing of the globalization tendencies: the number of employees in 
the Asian and North American subsidiaries have substantially increased between 1990 and 1994, 
whereas Japanese manufacturing employment fell in a comparable way during the same period.   
 
Regarding the sub-contracting system and subsequently the role of SMEs, there is gathering 
evidence that it undergoes substantial changes to accommodate for the very weak demand of 
consumer products. Turner (1994) observed that Japanese companies were sub-contracting more 
labor-intensive work overseas, particularly within Asia; also, he remarked that the keiretsu system 
was beginning to loosen up. However, we cannot as yet generalize; for instance Lincoln et al 
(1998, p.242) concluded, “…While some prominent keiretsu partnerships are indeed loosening, 
elsewhere the form is alive and well…”, whereas some other writers took a more extreme stand, 
e.g., Sugiura (2002) talked about the meltdown of the automobile keiretsu, the metamorphosis of 
industrial agglomerations, and the weakening of the entrepreneurial spirit.  
 
This type of suggestions is also present in other studies such as that of Tezuka (1997); this author 
also proposes that the intense competitive nature of many Japanese industries might be an 
impediment to economic growth. In addition, other radical changes are taking place in the last few 
years; for example, the competition with imports is intensified (Lux, 1997); also, Japan finally  
  15
‘goes web crazy’ (Rohwer, 2000). This new direction will certainly alter several economic 
structures as this last author comments. 
 
“…Japan is what you might call a middleman economy, and if there is anything the Internet is 
great at, it’s killing off middlemen. Whether it’s banking, retailing, or health care, the Internet will 
lower transaction costs, reduce the number of workers, and streamline communications…” (Ibid, p. 
116)  
 
All these changes and perhaps many others such as firing of employees (a rare phenomenon before 
this prolonged recession) are indicative that many new OIs will eventually emerge and probably 
new leading sectors will come forward. Thus, Lux (1997, p. 38) suggests: “…By combining the 
best of Western management with the best of Japan and the dedication of Japanese employees, 
companies that will be able to accomplish this transformation process successfully will become 
awesome competitors again…” Kono and Clegg (2001) also suggest a new hybrid Japanese model 
of management and production that will retain many existing features and adopt new ones such as 
horizontal alliances and a more flexible employment. Finally It must be a dded that the dilemma 
about whether the ‘Western’ or ‘Japanese’ overall system of production is superior is only a 
rhetoric question. As I had the opportunity to emphasize several times so far, what is ‘good’ in one 
country or in one period is not necessarily ‘good’ in another country or in another period (for 
instance, regarding OIs or TIs).   
 
4  The Role of TIs in the USA and Japan since WWII  
 
In this section a comparison of TIs in the two countries will be outlined (the analysis is far from 
being exhaustive). This comparison is more an account of what happened in Japan than in the 
USA, but since Japan has been mainly an imitator of technologies the comparison is rather 
implicit. Both nations adopted similar technologies almost everywhere, despite some lags and 
leads of a short duration, mainly because the Japanese firms copied the Americans substantially. 
This process of technical copying was accompanied by adaptations and appropriate changes to fit 
the local circumstances; however, the Japanese also introduced new products mainly in the 
electronics industry (see below) and in personal items such as crystal quartz watches and 
automatic cameras (cf. Kono and Clegg, p. 206). Thus, the conclusions of this comparison will 
further support arguments of this paper that differences between the rates of growth of American 
and Japanese industries are due to differences in OIs and not TIs since the TIs have been basically 
similar in the two countries in most cases. Consequently, as SMEs function within the context of 
OIs (for example, SMEs are very important in the context of the JIT/QC system implemented 
originally in Japan and recently in the USA, cf. Sanidas, 2001) they also follow the impact of OIs 
on the economy, either negatively or positively. 
 
Before briefly analyzing some major industries in terms of TIs (and incidentally of OIs) it is worth 
mentioning six important aspects of the Japanese way of importing foreign technology (Odagiri 
and Goto, 1996, pp. 39-40). 
1.  Imported machinery and equipment helped many industries in a critical way to improve 
the product quality and productivity. Domestic machinery manufacturing then tried to 
reverse-engineer, by copying the imported capital until eventually they completely 
replaced it. 
2.  Japanese firms eagerly sought technological agreements primarily with the USA and also 
with European firms. 
3.  Consultants, mostly Americans, were hired to help to modernize the production processes. 
4.  The purchase of blueprints was also common. 
5.  Japanese companies often sent their engineers abroad to seek promising technologies. 
6.  Japan restricted direct investment (DI) until the gradual liberalization in the late 1960s and 
the early 1970s. However, even today, DI still remains at a relatively low level. 
 
4.1  Iron and Steel industries 
 
These industries in Japan like the others described in this sub-section (and generally like all 
industries) were initially protected by government measures until they took off. At the same time,  
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they were very competitive in their structure as oligopolies. This competition was one of the main 
reasons why some leading steel firms in Japan were the pioneers in introducing new imported 
technologies and subsequently improving on them substantially. Following Odagiri and Goto’s 
(1996) account, some examples will illustrate the industry. 
 
At the start of the 1950s, Kawasaki Steel decided to build a new large plant despite the fact that 
two-thirds of the existing furnaces were then idle in Japan. The real novelty of this plant was 
related not to TIs but to OIs in terms of location and layout. Whereas it was common to build an 
ironworks near a coal mine or an iron-ore mine, Kawasaki’s entrepreneurial spirit (through its 
president) built the new plant near the huge market of Tokyo, and it made a layout such that 
movements of materials and half-made products were minimized.  This OI was soon followed by 
the other steel producers in a very competitive oligopolistic market.  
 
However, it was also TIs that made the Japanese firms the best in the world for the second half of 
the 20
th century. In the first place, the new technology of basic oxygen furnace  was imported from 
Austria, but it was soon found that there were major problems in operating such furnaces. These 
problems were resolved with some TIs introduced by the Japanese firms and in particular by the 
Yawata Company, which invented an oxygen converter gas recovery system that was soon 
adopted worldwide. Secondly, another technology known as continuous casting that was originally 
developed in Switzerland was imported by the Kawasaki firm who built a new plant with this 
technology in 1967, again pushed to take such a risky decision by the intense prevailing 
oligopolistic competition. By 1980, the process continuous casting had been adopted by 60% of 
the Japanese plants but only 20% of the American plants (Odagiri and Goto, 1996, p. 152). As 
these two authors remarked: 
“…As a result of this and other innovations, Japan’s productivity increase has outpaced that of 
other countries with companies starting to export technology and know-how in plant construction 
and operation to many countries, including both developing countries, such as Brazil, and 
developed countries, such as Italy and the USA. In 1974 receipt of royalties exceeded payments for 
the first time among Japanese industries…”  
 
These ‘other innovations’ of the above quote were not only TIs but also, and perhaps, mainly, OIs 
as these two writers emphasized. OIs included the active participation of workers in management 
and technical matters, so that firms attained company-wide involvement in productivity 
improvement. Florida and Kenney (1992) have analyzed some of these OIs in Japan and in 
Japanese direct investment in the USA; thus, the firm NKK, for example, pioneered the use of QC 
circles in the steel industry; the same authors have also stressed the differences between the 
American and Japanese TIs and OIs, for instance “…The US steel industry was the paradigmatic 
case of ‘Taylorist’ scientific management…In contrast, the Japanese steel industry developed a 
system of production o rganization and labor-management relations that harnessed workers’ 
intellectual as well as physical capabilities…” (Ibid, p. 150).   
 
4.2  Automotive industries 
 
Cars were first developed by the Europeans at the end of the 19
th century, but it was the Americans 
with Ford’s mass production that popularized the car consumption in the 1910s and 1920s. The 
Japanese made many attempts to establish their own vehicle industry from the start of the 20
th 
century (Odagiri and Goto, 1996), but it was only in the 1930s that they finally succeeded with 
Nissan and Toyota. Again, the technology was mostly imported or through reverse engineering 
adapted and probably improved. Odagiri and Goto, (1996) provide us with some details. Nissan, in 
their Yokohama plant before WWII bought the whole production equipment including jigs and 
tools as well as technology from the Graham-Paige Company in Detroit, and shipped them to 
Japan (this American company was the 14
th largest auto producer in the USA but was planning to 
liquidate because of financial difficulties). Nissan repeated technology importation after WWII 
when it formed a tie-up with British Austin.  
 
For Toyota, the story is similar to Nissan’s but also more creative in terms of both TIs and OIs. 
One of its engineers stayed in The USA at Ford and other plants, and upon return to Japan he 
started to disassemble a Chevrolet engine and copy it in an experimental plant built within Toyoda  
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Automatic Loom. Eventually, Toyota decided to use many of Chevrolet’s and Ford’s parts and 
also buy many materials and components from outside suppliers. This was the origin of this 
company’s supplier system. By 1938 Toyota had an R&D division, thus putting an official 
emphasis on its determination to create its own car technology. This took place much later after 
WWII with the Corolla model and so on. 
 
The impossibility of foreign firms exporting to Japan or setting up production facilities within 
Japan led some of them to sell their technology to Japanese firms. Thus, Rootes (UK, producer of 
Hillman, later acquired by Chrysler and then Peugeot), Renault (France), and Willys-Overland 
(USA, producer of jeep, later acquired by American Motors and then Chrysler) consented to sell 
their technology to, respectively, Isuzu, Hino, and Mitsubishi. With these tie-ups started in 1952-3, 
the Japanese firms succeeded in complete domestic production within 5 years (Odagiri and Goto, 
1996. p. 196). 
 
These brief reports of some major car producers in Japan clearly show that the technology in both 
the USA and Japan was similar since the Japanese mostly imitated Western vehicle producers. 
Consequently, one can safely conclude that the success of the Japanese car industry did not lie in 
TIs but in OIs. Odagiri and Goto, 1996. p. 202 summed up the situation as follows. 
“…The strength of the post-war Japanese automobile industry is probably most evident in the fields 
of production management and human resource management, including training programs and the 
TQC (total quality control) movement. Toyota’s kanban and just-in-time production system and 
keiretsu supplier system are well-known…”    
 
4.3  Electrical and electronic industries 
 
Table 2 shows the major electrical appliances introduced in the postwar era (Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1998). 
 
Table 3 Major Electrical Appliances Introduced in the Postwar Era 
1950s    1960s  1970s  1980s 
Refrigerator-freezer  Color television  Microwave oven  Home computer 
Television  Dishwasher  Heat pump  Large-screen television 
Clothes dryer  Central air conditioning  Trash compactor  Video cassette recorder 
Automatic washing 
machine 
Space heating  Food processor  Compact-disc player 
Room air conditioner  Frost-free refrigerator-
freezer 
  Home satellite receiver 
  Waste disposal     
Source: Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998, p. 108 
 
Although color TV was initially developed by the Americans and Europeans in the 1960s, the 
Japanese not only, once more, successfully imitated at the beginning, but they also introduced their 
own creations in terms of the Trinitron tube by Sony and a solid-state color receiver by Hitachi 
(Clark, 1987). Several other new products were developed in this industry, such as games 
machines, high quality LCDs and DVDs, as it is demonstrated below. 
 
Although the Americans invented the transistor in 1947, it was only in 1955 that the Japanese 
succeeded in making a transistor themselves after some years of struggle especially in purifying 
silicon to almost 100%. Odagiri and Goto (1996, p. 166) quoted one of the Japanese ‘inventors’, 
Kikuchi saying: “…Some people say that the transistor was just a borrowed technology. I would 
like to say from my own experience that the transistor is a kind of thing that, if you can copy it, it 
in itself is a spectacular achievement…” Sony’s transistor radio tells us a similar story. Though 
Sony had already developed and marketed tape recorders by 1952, it was not until it made the 
transistor radio another successful consumer product that this company became a household name 
and a multinational. At the beginning of production and marketing of this radio the ratio of defects 
was very high despite the huge efforts by Sony’s Ibuka to technically improve the transistor 
quality; at the same time competition by other large producers became intense very soon. As 
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“…The only solution was to reduce defects. According to Ibuka, it was the instinct and insistence of 
a female production worker to scrutinize all the processes to find out the causes of defects. 
Following her suggestions, the engineers started the cumbersome task of testing every product at 
every point of the process and came to the conclusion that the use of antimony caused the problem. 
After several trials, they started using phosphorus instead and the yield rate greatly improved. This 
innovation helped Sony to solve both of the problems above and put the company in a more 
advantageous position in its competition against other larger rivals…” 
 
Sony’s case just briefly described also shows another aspect of interplay between OIs and TIs, that 
is, the workers’ participation in improving the product and the production process, which is an OI, 
has a positive impact on TIs.  
 
The integrated circuits (ICs) became a practical device around 1959 with the invention of solid-
state circuits by the Texas Instruments, and the introduction of planar processing to interconnect 
circuit elements at Fairchild Semiconductors in the USA. Despite some new methods to bypass the 
planar processing by Hitachi and Toshiba, the semiconductor technology was initially developed 
in Japan because of the world’s first electronic calculator introduced by Sharp in 1964 (Odagiri 
and Goto, 1996, p. 171) priced at US$1400. By 1969, Sharp had reduced its price to US$300 by 
using American large-scale ICs (LSI) (produced by Rockwell). Before this last version, Sharp had 
used Japanese metal oxide semiconductor ICs produced by Mitsubishi, Hitachi, and NEC. In 1971 
there were at least 20 Japanese and several foreign firms (thus making a total of 33) producing a 
similar calculator to that one by Sharp. The calculator war e ventually ended leaving only two 
survivors, Sharp and Casio.  
 
However, as Odagiri and Goto (1996, p. 173) remarked:  “…The Japanese suppliers had by then 
established LSI technology and their reliability in quality and delivery helped them to regain a 
position as the main suppliers of semiconductors to calculator producers…” For instance, in terms 
of quality, in a test of about 300,000 memory chips (bought from American and Japanese firms) 
conducted by Hewlett-Packard in the late 1970s, none of the Japanese lots was rejected because of 
failures, whereas the failures for American chips ranged from 0.11 to 0.19 per cent (Ibid, p. 274). 
As it was mentioned earlier, the quality control and just-in-time processes (JIT/QC) were the main 
weapons that Japanese firms had against the American technical superiority in order to establish 
themselves in world markets. Thus, once more, OIs seem to prove themselves as being very 
important in promoting industrial growth through leading firms.     
 
Finally, regarding the origins of microprocessors, Intel in the USA was the innovator in 1971 with 
the 4004 model. Once again, the Japanese firms were the followers, though as Odagiri and Goto 
(1996, p. 173) remarked, it was also a Japanese engineer who helped Intel to develop the first two 
microprocessors, which triggered the PC (personal computer) revolution. 
 
5  More evidence from two leading sectors  
 
5.1  The Semiconductor Industry 
(A story based on Langlois and Steinmueller’s (1999, pp. 19-78) analysis of the world evolution of 
this industry).  
 
This industry started with the invention of the transistor by American researchers in the Bell 
telephone Laboratories after WWII. This invention became innovation in business through 
AT&T’s  commercial applications and this company’s policy to let the diffusion of the new 
technology to many other interested parties. Subsequent researchers and entrepreneurs gradually 
established what is known today as the ‘Silicon Valley”, a Marshallian industrial district in the 
1950s. In the first place, the germanium metal was used for the transistor, but it was taken over by 
the silicon substance towards the end of the 1960s. During that time, the American Defense 
department was the main user. By 1960-61, the Americans were producing and consuming 
semiconductors about 10 times more than the Japanese, and 20 times more than the major 
European countries. Meanwhile, Japan through some governmental protectionist policies boosted 
the Japanese semiconductor industry, which thus, had an export surplus from 1956 to 1968. About 
70% of this industry’s market remained in consumer electronics such as transistor radio.     
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Then, the integrated-circuit (IC) era arrived. This era revolutionized the whole electronics industry 
and the whole economy eventually. This can be seen through the explosive way that IC grew in 30 
years (from about 1960 to 1990): “…Transistor counts per IC increased from 10 to 4,000 in the 
first decade of the industry’s history; from 4,000 to over 500,000 in the second decade; and from 
500,000 to 100 m illion in the third decade…”  (Ibid, p. 32). One of the impacts this new 
revolutionary technology had on the American semiconductor sector was that the vertically 
integrated American electronics companies that had led to the production of vacuum tubes, and 
that had been able to stay in the race during the discrete semiconductor era, became almost 
completely non-existent by 1975 from the top list of relevant leading firms. At the same time many 
relatively specialized new and smaller manufacturers entered the market; this was consistent with 
the strategy of ‘core competences’ (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) as the authors Langlois and 
Steinmueller  remarked (1999, p. 33).  
 
Meanwhile, a parallel strong development of the computers industry helped IBM become the 
dominant firm not only in computers but also in semiconductors during the 1970s.  Thus, in the 
USA, there was, besides the two giant captive producers AT&T and IBM, a cluster of many, small, 
highly specialized merchant firms, which focused on their core competences while expanding their 
technical abilities. All these companies faced two options, either to produce high volume standard 
products such as memories, or/and to produce differentiated products. For a time, they were able to 
do well with both sets of strategies. 
 
However, during the period between late 1970s and late 1980s, the situation changed dramatically. 
Whereas in 1978, American sales of semiconductors and IC constituted 59% and 74% respectively 
of the world market as against 28% and 20% for Japan, in 1989 the corresponding figures were 
43% (semiconductors), 45% (IC) for the USA and 48%, 47% for Japan. The authors (Ibid, p. 41) 
explained that since the profit margins of the American semiconductor (and IC) industry has 
always been relatively low, not enough investment was possible from retained earnings for a 
flexible and dynamic production path with serious ups and downs of economic activity. On the 
contrary, the Japanese firms being more vertically integrated than the American ones in this 
particular industry were able to mobilize internal capital resources to make the necessary 
investments to expand capacity and enhance manufacturing quality. 
 
Indeed, the Japanese firms expanded their production of IC capacity in order to produce the 
emerging dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) market in very large quantities. This strategy 
was assisted by a strong internal end-use demand originating mainly from consumer electronics 
and to a lesser extent from telecommunications. This entire situation was further assisted by the 
active involvement of NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) and of MITI. Did the Japanese 
finally dominate the world semiconductor industry? (Meanwhile the Europeans were never able to 
threaten the American-Japanese supremacy in this field)  
 
The answer is no. The American resurgence took place from the late 1980s and still runs its 
course. Despite the concentration of American firms on producing NMOS (negative metal oxide 
semiconductor) in the first place, they switched on to the more used CMOS (complementary 
MOS) with considerable success. Overall, “…What evidence is there that American firms 
improved their manufacturing productivity significantly?” the authors asked (Ibid, p. 49). Besides 
the indirect evidence that they held their market shares in a number of product segments, 
“…There is also more direct evidence. One of the factors driving the success of Japanese firms in 
memory products in the early 1980s was the higher quality of the chips they produced. For 
Japanese chips, defect rates- the fraction of chips that prove to be defective – were probably half to 
one-tenth the rates for American products. By the second half of that decade, however, American 
firms had dramatically increased expenditures for quality control, imitating Japanese practices 
such as total quality management (TQM), greater attention to preventive maintenance, and 
automated process control and monitoring. By the early 1990s, American manufacturers had 
probably begun to match the defect levels of their Japanese counterparts. Intel reportedly reduced 
its defect rate by a factor of 10. There is also evidence that American firms have improved 
manufacturing yield rates and direct labor productivity since the early 1990s…” (Ibid, p. 49). 
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Furthermore, the American semiconductor ( and CI) industry (ASI) became gradually more 
narrow-product focused, and more specialized, building on existing competences in design 
(especially of logic and specialty circuits, such as the microprocessor unit (MPU). The increasing 
decoupling of design from production reinforced this specialization; at the same time, the ASI 
became more globalized.  
 
Finally, the governments’ role in shaping the new situation was positive but not significant to the 
point of being predominant. For instance, the American and Japanese authorities signed the 
Semiconductor Trade Agreement (STA) in 1986 to control prices and monitor outputs, which 
induced the MITI to create a mechanism to police and manage the Japanese cartel of chip 
producers. Eventually, for other reasons as well, that cartel collapsed. In the USA, the 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consortium (Sematech) mainly contributed in the 
enforcement of cooperation between the American chip producers, thus imitating again the 
“Japanese Model” of collaboration, cooperation, and coordination within the system of keiretsus.  
    
Table 4        Differences between ASI and JSI 
The ASI  The JSI 
Smaller independent firms clustered in industrial 
districts 
 
IC producers are also typically computer producers 
Efforts concentrated in core competences 
 
Failure to develop a vibrant domestic personal 
computer industry 
Fragmentation and vertical specialization  More vertically integrated firms  
Finer division of labor  Consumer-related applications 
Wider network of capabilities  Memory-intensive chips production (e.g. DRAMs) 
Burgeoning domestic personal computer industry 
and market 
Mass production and low value per unit produced 
Computer-related applications  No major consumer-related new products in the last 
12 years or so 
Design-intensive logic chips production (e.g. 
MPUs) 
Intense competition between large producers, 
mainly keiretsus 
High value per unit produced  The DRAMs market penetrated by other Asian 
countries (especially Korea, Taiwan) 
Recent practices of TQC, JIT   Traditional practices of TQC, JIT  
Source: Based on Langlois and Steinmueller’s (1999) 
 
The revival of the ASI can be gauged by considering the firm Intel, which became the largest IC 
producer in the world, with sales of $9.85 billion in 1994, $1 billion more than the second largest 
producer NEC of Japan. Intel’s principal competitors are also American firms, such as Motorola, 
Cyrix and AMD. 
  
Based on the same source, Table 4 summarizes the differences between the ASI (especially during 
its revival between the  late 1980s and now) and the Japanese semiconductor industry (JSI). The 
emphasis in this Table is put onto various aspects of OIs.  
 
5.2  The Personal Computer (PC) Industry and the Dell Computers Corporation 
(Dell CC) 
(A story based on Thomson and Gamble’s (2001, pp. C-132 to C-173) analysis of the evolution of 
this industry in the USA in the most recent period).  
 
DELL CC is one of the most successful business stories in the USA in the last 20 years. It is also 
an excellent example of how an entrepreneur (M. Dell), his managers and his personnel have 
pioneered in introducing OIs (and not TIs) in order to become the industry’s leader not only in the 
USA but also in the whole world. The initial OIs were marketing-oriented: Dell’s new company in 
1984 was able to sell IBM clones at about 40% below the price of an IBM PC; also, Dell sold his 
computers directly to large customers and eventually to individual customers through the internet. 
By late 1997, Dell had become the global industry leader in keeping costs down by achieving what 
Dell called a ‘virtual integrated’ firm- “…a stitching together of Dell’s business with its supply  
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partners and customers in real time such that all three appeared to be part of the same 
organizational team…” (p. C-136). 
 
Overall, Dell’s three golden rules have become: (1) Disdain inventory, (2) Always listen to the 
customer, and (3) Never sell indirect. The first rule will now be closely scrutinized. 
 
The companies, which started the PC industry in the 1980s, manufactured many of the components 
themselves, thus being at least partially vertically integrated. However, as the industry grew very 
rapidly, as TIs were introduced more frequently, the PC manufacturers could not keep pace with 
being experts on all fronts, thus more and more specialist firms emerged that could mass-produce 
cheaper and technologically advanced components. Consequently, vertical disintegration became 
more and more prevalent in PC producers. DELL CC’s first steps consistent with its established 
rule to sell directly to customers have captured this tendency for vertical disintegration. All this 
entailed two fundamental features of this company: an extensive outsourcing and virtually no in-
house stock of finished goods inventories. Dell’s build-to-order policy has been working in all 
directions. 
 
DELL CC established long-term relationships with its best suppliers, such as Intel and Sony, and 
laid the basis for JIT delivery of suppliers’ products to Dell’s assembly plants. At the same time, 
DELL CC itself practiced JIT, thus yielding major cost advantages and shortening the time it took 
for Dell to get new generations of its computer models into the marketplace. The authors Thomson 
and Gamble (2001, p. C -150) quoted Dell himself explaining the economics of minimal 
inventories. 
 
“…If I’ve got 11 days of inventory and my competitor has 80 and Intel comes out with a new 450-
megahertz chip, that means I’m going to get to market 69 days sooner. In the computer industry, 
inventory can be a pretty massive risk because if the cost of materials is going down 50% a year 
and you have two or three months of inventory versus 11 days, you’ve got a big cost disadvantage. 
And you’re vulnerable to product transitions, when you can get stuck with obsolete inventory…” 
 
The results of this deliberate JIT philosophy are impressive: only a few days of inventory for some 
components and a few hours for others. In 1995, DELL CC averaged an inventory turn ratio of 32 
days; in 1999, the ratio was 6 days’ supply; the long-term goal is to reach a 3-day average supply. 
All these efforts have made DELL CC the low cost leader of the PC industry, and a high profit 
company. 
 
Still regarding the JIT system, it is worth quoting the authors Thomson and Gamble (2001, p. C-
147-48) about a change of the operations on the shop floor that generated a huge productivity 
increase. This quote shows in a very concrete manner a good example of the POM and its related 
kinetic costs as these were fully explained in the previous chapter. 
 
“…Until 1997, Dell operated its assembly lines in traditional fashion, with each worker performing 
a single operation. An order form accompanied each metal chassis across the production floor; 
drives, chips, and ancillary items were installed to match customer specifications. As partly 
assembled PC arrived at a new workstation, the operator, standing beside a tall steel rack with 
drawers full of components, was instructed what to do by little red and green lights flashing beside 
the drawers containing the components the operator needed to install. When the operator was 
finished, the drawers containing the used components were automatically replenished from the 
other side, and the PC chassis glided down the line to the next workstation. However, Dell 
reorganized its plants in 1997, shifting to ‘cell manufacturing’ techniques whereby a team of 
workers operating at a group workstation (or cell) assembled an entire PC according to customer 
specification. The shift to cell manufacturing reduced Dell’s assembly times by 75 percent and 
doubled productivity per square foot of assembly space…”   
 
DELL CC’s OIs will now summarized so that a whole picture can be obtained. 
•  Build-to-order manufacturing 
•  Partnerships with suppliers 
•  JIT components inventories 
•  Direct sales to customers  
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•  Award-winning customer service and technical support 
•  Pioneering use of the Internet and e-commerce technology 
•  Strong demand forecasting skills 
•  Comparative advertisements  
•  Team work at all levels 
•  Avoidance of hierarchical structures in governance 
 
All these OIs (the TIs were almost absent) made DELL CC the leader in the PC industry 
surpassing previous leaders such as IBM and Compaq in a very short time. Now, DELL CC’s 
main competitors are trying to imitate the leader by introducing their own JIT process, their build-
to-order manufacturing and to speed new models to market. However, it is hard to duplicate Dell’s 
approach, as previous cases in other industries have shown. Thus, as of mid-1999 Compaq’s order-
to-delivery time was approximately 12 days versus 3.1 days at Dell (Thomson and Gamble (2001, 
p. C-165). 
 
To sum up this fascinating story, M. Dell started his company from zero in 1984 and today is the 
world leader followed by Compaq, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Gateway, Toshiba, about 30,000 
resellers of generic or ‘house-label’ PCs in North America alone and countless thousands more 
worldwide. All this was achieved by adopting or introducing OIs and virtually no TIs at all. Dell’s 
story in the PC industry is similar to Toyota’s story in the car industry, as far as the importance of 




The analysis presented in this paper has attempted to show  –in an indirect way, through a 
comparison between American and Japanese firms and sectors -that the same SMEs that played a 
positive role in the Japanese economic miracle during the 1970s and 1980s were not sufficient to 
restore the Japanese economy in the last 10 years or so.  At the same time, the same American 
SMEs that did not perform well during the 1970s and 1980s did exceptionally well during the 
1990s. It is thus proposed in this paper that the positive role of SMEs in economic growth can only 
be properly appreciated if examined within the context of OIs. The latter are the real moving force 
in accelerating manufacturing growth as it was shown in this study and in Sanidas, 2001. 
 
Three more general conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, during the period 1964 to 
1998, the manufacturing sectoral growth in the two counties was quite different; the differences, as 
detected by graphs and some cointegration tests, were due to differences in the adopted OIs 
amongst other factors. Thus, during the 1960s up to the mid 1980s, most Japanese industries 
exhibited very high growth rates both in the real output and TFP, contrary to the American 
industries. This was primarily due to the high quality and low cost of many Japanese products, and 
hence it became easy for Japanese firms to penetrate national and foreign markets. This last 
conclusion is supported by the review of TIs in the two countries, which confirms the tendency by 
Japanese firms to imitate foreign TIs, though in some instances these firms dominated world 
markets by launching new products (mainly in the consumer electronics sector); thus, the common 
TIs used in the majority of both American and Japanese firms reinforces the conclusion that it was 
in the area of differences in OIs that a more comprehensive explanation can be sought for the 
substantial differences in manufacturing sectoral growth in real output and TFP between these two 
countries in the period between the 1960s and the mid 1980s. During this period, the most 
notorious Japanese leading firms were in the transport, electrical and electronics sectors, which all 
adopted the holistic JIT/QC system as the fundamental OI in their production processes.    
 
Second, during the sub-period 1987 to 1997, the situation was reversed between the two countries 
in several ways. Whereas the machinery, both mechanical and electrical, industries led the 
American revival of the American economy, in Japan there was no leading sector for the first time 
in a long time in the Japanese economic history. The Japanese industries are still in a deep and 
prolonged recession since the beginning of the 1990s; a brief review of the reasons for this 
downfall seems to strongly indicate that the dual character of the Japanese economy, the  
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inexistence of leading firms and sectors, and a search for new OIs in the management of firms in 
Japan are the main factors that are contributing to this recession.  
 
And third, more detailed accounts of two leading industries and their corresponding leading firms 
add more evidence of the importance of OIs in manufacturing sectoral growth as discussed in this 
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APPENDIX A2  Tests for unit roots and cointegration 
 
For the sector “Non-ferrous metals” 
 
  A] Unit root tests for variable USA 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend 
 
31 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. 
Sample period from 1968 to 1998 
 
Test Statistic  LL  AIC  SBC  HQC 
 
DF  -2.0274  -108.4781  -110.4781  -111.9121  -110.9456 
ADF(1)  -1.6705  -108.4724  -111.4724  -113.6234  -112.1735 
ADF(2)  -1.1805  -108.1228  -112.1228  -114.9908  -113.0577 
ADF(3)  -84227  -107.6555  -112.6555  -116.2404  -113.8241 
ADF(4)  -.71227  -107.4071  -113.4071  -117.7090  -114.8094 
 
95%  critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic =  -2.9591 
LL  = Maximized log-likelihood  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
 
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian criterion  HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
 
  Unit root tests for variable USA 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend 
 
31 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. 
Sample period from 1968 to 1998 
 
Test Statistic  LL  AIC  SBC  HQC 
 
DF  -3.0186  -106.1405  -109.1405  -111.2915  -109.8417 
ADF(1)  -2.8184  -105.8907  -109.8907  -112.7587  -110.8256 
ADF(2)  -2.3285  -105.8900  -110.8900  -114.4750  -112.0586 
ADF(3)  -1.9179  -105.8690  -111.8690  -116.1710  -113.2713 
ADF(4)  -1.7177  -105.8637  -112.8637  -117.8826  -114.4997 
 
95%  critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic =  -3.5615 
LL  = Maximized log-likelihood  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
 
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
 
  B] Unit root tests for variable JAP 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend 
 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. Sample 
period from 1966 to 1998 
 
Test Statistic  LL  AIC  SBC  HQC 
 
DF  -1.7628  -100.1977  -102.1977  -103.6942  -102.7012 
ADF(l)  -1.7876  -100.0085  -103.0085  -105.2533  -103.7638 
ADF(2)  -1.9259  -96.0344  -100.0344  -103.0274  -101.0415 
 
95%  critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic =  -2.9528 
LL  = Maximized log-likelihood  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
 
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
 
Unit root tests for variable JAP 
 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend  
 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. Sample 
period from 1966 to 1998 
 
Test Statistic  LL  AIC  SBC  HQC 
 
DF  -2.9427  -96.9774  -99.9774  -102.2221  -100.7327 
ADF(1)  -3.4806  -95.3083  -99.3083  -102.3013  -100.3154 
ADF(2)  -2.4837  -93.6186  -98.6186  -102.3599  -99.8775 
 
95%  critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic =  -3.5514 
LL  = Maximized log-likelihood  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
 
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
 
 
  C] Unit root tests for variable JADUS 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend 
 
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. 
Sample period from 1967 to 1998 
 
Test Statistic  LL  AIC  SBC  HQC 
 
DF  -2.4976  -105.6847  -107.6847  -109~1504  -108.170S 
ADF(1)  -2.2933  -104.6291  -107.6291  -109.8277  -108.3579 
ADF(2)  -2.1649  -104.5057  -108.5057  -111.4372  -109.4774 
ADF(3)  -1.9885  -103.7160  -108.7160  -112.3803  -109.9306 
 
95%  critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic =  -2.9558 
LL  = Maximized log-likelihood  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
 
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
 
  Unit root tests for variable JADUS 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend 
 
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. 
Sample period from 1967 to 1998 
 
Test Statistic  LL  AIC  SBC  HQC 
 
DF  -3.0638  -103.2447  -106.2447  -108.4433  -106.9735 
ADF(1)  -2.3074  -103.1999  -107.1999  -110.1314  -108.1716 
ADF(2)  -2.1433  -103.08S2  -108.0852  -111.7495  -109.2998 
ADF(3)  -1.4563  -103.0516  -109.0516  -113.4488  -110.5091 
 
95%  critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic =  -3.5562 
LL  = Maximized log-likelihood  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
 
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
  
 
  D] Unit root tests for variable DJADUS 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend 
 
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. Sample 
period from 1967 to 1998 
 
Test Statistic  LL  AIC  SBC  HQC 
 
DF  -7.1986  -107.2957  -109.2957  -110.7615  -109.7816 
ADF(1)  -4.9865  -106.9819  -109.9819  -112.1805  -110.7107 
ADF(2)  -4.7891  -105.9027  -109.9027  -112.8342  -110.8744 
 
95%  critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic =  -2.9558 
LL  = Maximized log-likelihood  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
 
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
 
Unit root tests for variable DJADUS 
 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend 
 
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. Sample 
period from 1967 to 1998 
 
Test Statistic  LL  AIC  SBC  HQC 
 
DF  -7.4789  -105.9851  -108.9851  -111.1837  -109.7139 
ADF(1)  -5.2220  -105.5991  -109.5991  -112.5305  -110.5708 
ADF(2)  -5.0663  -104.3061  -109.3061  -112.9705  -110.5208 
 
95%  critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic =  -3.5562 
LL  = Maximized log-likelihood  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
 
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
 
 
   
E]Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
 
35 observations from 1964 to 1998. Order of VAR = 1. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
USA  JAP 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
 
.26229   .070828 
 
Null  Alternative  Statistic  95% Critical Value 90% Critical value 
 
r = 0  r = 1  10.6473  14.8800  12.9800 
r<= 1  r = 2  2.5712  8.0700  6.5000 
 
Use the above table to determine r (the number of cointegrating vectors). 
 
 
Cointegration. with unrestricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
  Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
 
35 observations from 1964 to 1998. Order of VAR = 1. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
USA  JAP  
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
 
.26229   .070828 
 
Null  Alternative  Statistic  95% Critical Value 90W Critical Value 
 
r = 0  r>= 1  13.2185  17.8600  15.7500 
r<= 1  r = 2  2.5712  8.0700  6.5000 
 
Use the above table to determine r (the number of cointegrating vectors). 
 
 
Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
 
Choice of the Number of Cointegrating Relations Using Model Selection 
Criteria 
 
35 observations from 1964 to 1998. Order of VAR = 1. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
USA  JAP 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
 
.26229  .070828 
  Rank  Maximized LL  AIC  SBC  HQC 
r = 0   -225.5383  -227.5383  -229.0936  -228.0752 
r = 1   -220.2146  -225.2146  -229.1030  -226.5569 
r = 2   -218.9291  -224.9291  -229.5951  -226.5398 
 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion  SBC  Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 





 APPENDIX A3 
List of manufacturing sectors on a 3-digit basis with their code numbers 
311     Food 
313     Beverages 
314     Tobacco 
321     Textiles 
322     Apparel 
323     Leather 
324     Footwear 
331     Wood products 
332     Furniture 
341     Paper products 
342     Printing and publishing 
351     Industrial chemicals 
352     Other chemicals 
353     Petroleum refineries 
354     Miscellaneous petroleum and coal 
355     Rubber 
356     Plastics 
361     Pottery and china 
362     Glass products 
369     Other non-metallic minerals 
371     Iron and steel 
372     Non-Ferrous metals 
381     Fabricated metals 
382     Machinery (not electric) 
383     Electric and electronic machinery 
384     Transport equipment 
385     Scientific equipment 
390     Other 